What can Singapore learn from Ukraine’s experience with disinformation over eight years of war?
The employment of disinformation leading up to and across the duration of the ongoing war in Ukraine indicate the extent to which disinformation has developed to become a tool of warfare. Singapore may not be located in geographical proximity to the conflict but it shares with Ukraine the characteristics of a common history with regional neighbours, highlighting our potential vulnerability to similar disinformation efforts.
Russia’s propaganda campaigns in Ukraine indicate how some state actors have diversified disinformation efforts across multiple vectors, including official statements, traditional media and new digital media platforms. Ukraine has had to adapt its disinformation strategy over recent years to address the realities of the modern information space.
These lessons are especially pertinent in Singapore, where society’s high level of digital connectedness amplifies the effects and reach of online disinformation. In the face of this challenge, Singapore must expand its information strategy to encompass a whole-of-society approach that relies on cooperation with civil society organisations. As shown in Ukraine, this would help bridge the gap between governments and the public in terms of trust and capabilities, while playing a vital role in educating the public and improving resilience against disinformation.
These findings are contained within the following report.Ukraine Info Ops Part 2- Specific Lessons to learn for SG 210622